Young Poles 2018 – Torn between material comfort and social change

By Filip Pazderski

 Young people in Poland mistrust the public institutions of representative democracy, but show few signs of wanting to actively change things. The Open Society European Policy Institute and d|part did the research.

final picPoland’s representative democracy is floundering as the governing Law and Justice party (PiS) dismantles many checks and balances. The party nevertheless has significant public support and that’s often explained by many people’s disappointment with politics, and a significant part of society that feels they haven’t benefitted from the economic transformation.

Young Poles also reflect both these attitudes. They take democracy for granted (rather than something for which one had to fight on a daily basis – as their elders did) and they show few signs of wanting to take things in hand to change the situation. Their fatalistic attitude is simply that Poland’s political party system is rotten.[1]

The passivity of the younger generation has been a fact of social life since the fall of communism. This hasn’t changed significantly yet, although opinion polls indicate some increase in their participation[2], as the younger generation is apparently beginning to understand the value of democratic institutions.[3]

Second, particularly since the 2008 economic crisis, young Poles are no different to their peers across the continent and are finding it hard to find a suitable place in the capitalistic social model. They are more concerned about material comfort and work conditions, with the important difference being that Poland is among the few countries in the EU that maintained a healthy economic growth rate during the post-2008 recession, and has now reached unprecedented levels of material comfort.

Despite the positive economic indicators, young Poles have expressed their disappointment and outrage at the ballot box. This shift could already be observed in 2011 and has continued since. In the 2015 general elections, voters between the ages of 18 and 29 supported anti-establishment and opposition candidates.

Three quarters voted against the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO), which after eight years in government chalked up only 14.6 percent of young Poles' votes. Over a quarter, 25.8 percent, voted for the populists of PiS, 19.9 percent for the anti-establishment Kukiz'15 and 16.8 percent for the right-wing, eurosceptic Korwin party, which garnered three-quarters of the youngest voters’ total votes.

Young people also expressed their disillusionment by supporting more targeted interest groups. In 2012, the anti-ACTA movement opposed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, seen as a form internet censorship, and since 2016 the Black Monday (later Black Friday) protest has opposed the tightening of abortion law. Both movements support a range of issues, notably human rights, freedom of speech, abortion rights and unrestricted access to the internet.

Many young Poles also protested in July 2017 against the ruling party’s controversial reforms of the judicial system, and continue to defend core values of the rule of law. But it’s important to remember this only represents a small percentage of the Polish population.

Becoming richer or being fairer, which is more important?

Based on poling results, young people in Poland are keener than their peers in other EU countries to preserve their social security and quality of life. Respect for democracy comes second.

Surveys in seven Member States have shown Poles, along with the French, as the EU’s least optimistic young people when looking at the benefits of democracy, the least supportive of minorities, and the most comfortable with technocratic decision-making.

More significantly perhaps, young Poles were the least enthusiastic respondents to the notion of “accepting democratic decisions, even if they go against one’s own interests”. They, like the French, felt that “it is sometimes important to violate the rules of democracy in order to make important changes possible.”[4]

Research by the Open Society’s European Policy Institute’s Situation Room project has shown that young Poles are also less likely than the older generations to consider open society attributes as essential to a good society, and are a little keener to defend a number of closed society attributes.

They are also more willing than older age groups to trade off open society values for better life conditions. When asked whether they would swap treating immigrants equally for their own economic interests, younger Poles were likelier to say that wellbeing is more important than the fair treatment of immigrants. Yet a quarter of the same young people belong to the age group most supportive of newcomers, even if this predominantly concerns the 18-24-year-olds (see figure 1).

Figure 1. Willingness (in percentage) to trade off equal treatment of newcomers for improved economic wellbeing

figure 1 PL

Poles aged 18-24 and 25-34 are also likelier to believe that it is more important to protect their country’s social cohesion than it is to ensure the equal treatment of recent arrivals. The trade-off question (figure 2) shows that the two youngest age groups are the most likely to make a choice between the two options and are reluctant to see them as equally important. This may represent a relatively high polarisation of their opinion about two apparently competing values.

Figure 2. Willingness (in percentage) to trade off equal treatment of newcomers for safeguarding social cohesion

figure 2 PL

The Situation Room survey results should be read alongside another poll showing Polish youth as strongly opposed to accepting refugees, and having ambivalent views about other directions of social change. According to the Institute of Public Affairs’ (IPA) previous survey,  55 percent feel there should be more women in leadership positions, but far less are supportive of same-sex relationships, with almost half against.[5]   

This is very much a reflection of the general anti-immigrant and conservative views of much of Polish society. However, when the same young respondents were asked in the Situation Room survey to choose what best expressed the state of the political system, either 1. freedom, democracy, freedom of expression, or 2. living standards, the price of goods and availability of services, the Poles aged 18-24 and 25-34 chose the second option more than their elders.

They were also the age group that saw only one option as essential (more than members of other age groups), making the younger Polish generation the most polarised between the two extremes (see figure 3).

Figure 3. Question: “Some people assess the current political system in terms of freedom, democracy, the opportunity to express themselves and their opinion. Others tend argue for living standards, price of goods and availability of services. Which of the two is more important to you?”

Figure 3 PL

Young Poles were the happiest in the six-country survey about their country’s political situation, and the least satisfied with its economic climate (see figures 4 and 5).

Figure 4. Satisfaction with political situation

Figure 4 PL

Figure 5. Satisfaction with economic situation

Figure 5 PL

Recent research by the IPA and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) show that young Poles are very much concerned with what they see as the problematic areas of healthcare, the cost of living and pensions.

This would suggest that they are satisfied with the way the country is run, except in what concerns their economic situation (since young people are more likely to feel dissatisfied in this area).

If material comfort is more important to this generation than democratic principles (as shown by the Situation Room’s combined results for people aged 18-34), and they perceive economic and social welfare as the biggest problems, then it is not surprising if they are willing to trade off open society values for financial security.

This is even more the case if the open society value to be traded-off concerns the welcoming of foreigners. In such cases, young Poles presumably feel little solidary for the plight of migrants.

The degree to which Polish society accepts newcomers was dealt a serious blow by the rhetoric of Poland’s populists, particularly the PIS and Kukiz’15. Both political actors have been vociferous on migration, which hasn’t met with any visible reaction from the opposition parties.

As a result, since 2015 Poles have been increasingly hostile to migrants with that hostility now reaching its highest level ever (74 percent of Poles in 2017 were opposed to relocating refugees from the Middle East and Africa[7].

Young Poles might therefore be keener to trade off the welcoming of foreigners for a policy to improve the economy, its poor employment conditions, wage levels and pension system. Were politics based on fear of the other to be combined with improvements in social security that would make a dangerous mix, allowing political actors to win the votes of a significant proportion of young citizens.


What’s the next step for young voters?


What does the Situation Room survey tell us about how we can expect this generation to develop politically? Young people value higher standard of living over democracy, and at the same time they are dissatisfied with the political situation (even if older Poles are even more unhappy). On top of that, other surveys suggest that young people are reluctant to use the democratic system to change things they are dissatisfied with.[8]

It is true that a substantial number of young Poles have joined public protests against the present government’s anti-democratic moves, and favour progressive values like contraception and abortion. But a significant proportion is happy to sit back and reap the socio-economic rewards they owe to their parents and grandparents.

But even the last group, although they may be more concerned with maintaining their lifestyle than fighting for democracy, may eventually realise that economic development also means the strengthening of the socio-political gains achieved after 1989.

Then it is also difficult to guess how the larger group of young Poles will change their values and cultural priorities as they grow older. How many young people feel strongly about democracy in relation to how many value their material security may determine the future development of the open society in Poland.


The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.


[1] See: “Youth, Democracy, and Politics: Poland. Survey results”, NDI/IPA 2018,, p. 4-6.

[2] See: Roguska, B.,„Aktywność społeczno-polityczna Polaków” [Poles socio-political activity], CBOS survey report, No. 16/2016, February 2016.

[3] See: Szafraniec K. (2012), „Dojrzewający obywatele dojrzewającej demokracji…”, Instytut Obywatelski, Warsaw,  p. 17.

[4] See: “Young Europe 2018”, TUI Foundation 2018,, p. 25-35.

[5] See: Kucharczyk, J., Łada, A., Schöler, G. (eds., 2017), “Exit, voice or loyalty? Young people on Europe and democracy Case studies from Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia”, available at,25,944.html, p. 127-137.

[6] See: “Youth, Democracy, and Politics: Poland. Survey results”, NDI/IPA 2018,, p. 21.

[7] See: Głowacki, A., “Stosunek do przyjmowania uchodźców”[An attitude towards accepting refugees]. CBOS survey report, No. 44/2017, April 2017, p. 1-2.

[8] See: “Youth, Democracy, and Politics: Poland. Survey results”, NDI/IPA 2018, p. 5-6.


It’s not the economy, stupid!

Explaining the success of  authoritarian populism in Poland

By Jacek Kucharczyk


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In this article I argue that - contrary to prevailing wisdom - the rise of authoritarian populism in Poland, culminating with the electoral triumph of the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość - PiS) party in 2015, and the subsequent drift towards authoritarianism, cannot be fully accounted for by economic inequalites and the discontents of the “left behind” of Poland’s transformation from state socialism to market economy. Instead, I agree with Pippa Norris, who argues that populist authoritarianism ”can best be explained as a cultural backlash in Western societies against long-term, ongoing social change”[1]. In this vein, I argue that the driving forces of Poland’s populist upheaval are nativism, political Catholicism, and fear of Muslim refugees. Thus, the rise to power of authoritarian populists in Poland is better understood as a backlash against open society values and against parts of the politcal and cultural elites which are believed to represent these values. I further explain how the Law and Justice party has exploited this backlash by mobilizing its support base and demobilizing support for its competitors, ensuring its leading position on the political scene, despite protests and widespred domestic opposition to its policies. [2]


The "conservative" backlash

The contemporary rise of populist parties and movements is often attributed to a revolt of those left behind by economic globalization. In other words, populism is seen as a response to growing social inequality, as a by-product of the neoliberal “Washington consensus” that rose to prominence after 1989, and as a reaction to the financial and economic crisis of 2008. This explanation seems plausible in view of the fact that populism often draws support from the less affluent and less educated sections of society, especially men, whose economic position has become precarious in the globalized post-industrial economy. However, a growing body of research points out that this theory of the “mobilization of the dispossessed” has limited explanatory power.[3] On the contrary, the rise of authoritarian populism should be seen as a reaction to the liberal societal changes in recent decades.

Following Poland’s accession to the EU, many ideas and policies, once promoted by relatively marginal groups of feminist and LGBT activists, have become mainstreamed even if they not always have been transtalated into legislation (i.e mariage equality). In spite of the fact that most Poles formally remained members of the Roman Catholic Church, studies showed growing social and political divide along moral-cultural rather than socio-economic issues. “The silent revolution” in social values, which started in Western societies during the 1970s, came to Central Europe much later and has evoked strong adversarial reactions among the more traditional sections of society, backed by the hierarchy of the Catholic church.[4]

Although the PiS was elected on a ticket of generous socio-economic promises, its position as an unchalleged leader on the right of the polical spectrum after years in the opposition came from its strong profile on identity and sovereignty issues as well as its deep alliance with the Polish Catholic church. Indeed, as this study, conducted on the eve of the 2015 elections, demonstrates, the declared intentions to vote for the PiS party strongly correlated with strong views on issues of morality and identity, including religiosity, opposition to abortion and to deeper European integration.

Last but not least, the refugee crisis, and especially the controversial policy of the European Commission for mandatory quotas of Syrian refugees for each member state, brought about an upsurge of xenophobia, which has been actively encouraged by the PiS politicians and government-controlled media. One recent example of this is a tweet from the party’s official account: ”Don't let them tell you that aversion to refugees is something wrong”[5]. It well illustrates that the party not just seeks support from voters who share their xenophobic and islamopobic views, but provides its supporters with a kind of moral justification. Hating migrants becomes an act of patriotism or even defense of the ”Christian civilization”.

The refugee crisis and its (negative) resonance in the Polish society has added anti-immigration and anti-refugee sentiment to the Polish populist’s ideological toolbox. It also allowed the PiS to whip-up negative sentiments towards Germany and the European Union[6], making the Polish brand of populism rather similar to that of its West European counterparts[7].

Mobilization and demobilization of voters

Although the PiS - like all populist parties - claims to represent the “people” against the elites, it is highly debatable whether it has ever represented a majority of the Polish public.  The Law and Justice party won the parliamentary elections with just 37.8% of the total vote. The electoral turnout of just above 50% means that the PiS secured a narrow majority of votes with the support of just 18.6% of eligible voters, showing it owes its majority of seats to a demobilized public and the failure of left wing parties to cross the electoral threshold of 5%. Until 2017 the PiS further consolidated its majority by attracting a number of MPs from the anti-establisment Kukiz’15 grouping and exploiting the majority to pass a series of laws: dismantling key democratic checks and balances, including an independent judiciary, a professional civil service, and (independent) public media.[8]

Kaczyński’s party’s victory was possible through the creation of a highly effective “anger industry”, which fed on and amplified both prejudices and discontents of different social groups and individuals.[9] The right-wing media, both traditional and online, contributed to the creation of a “parallel reality”, where indignation at real and imaginary injustices and political malpractices was channeled against the purportedly intolerable status quo. While the villification of the elites served to whip up resentment among potential supporters, a parallel campaign was launched to convince undecided voters that Law and Justice was a normal conservative party, more competent than the incumbement and no threat to the stability of Polish democracy or European norms and values. Those warning about the PiS’s authoritarian and populist tendencies were ridiculed and branded as agents of the “status quo”. The same practice of mobilizing core supporters and demonizing opponents (memorably described as “Poles of the worst sort” and “tracherous faces” by PiS leader, Jarosław Kaczyński) continued after the PiS took over government - but with far greater resources at its disposal, including the public media.

Despite their controversial and divisive policies after two years in office, the support for the ruling Law and Justice party exceeds 40% of declared voters, more then 10 percentage points ahead of the two strongest opposition parties (Civic Platform and Modern Poland). If one considers declared absentees and undecided voters, support for the ruling party does not exceed one-third of the eligible citizenry. This last figure is consistent with the results of the survey conducted in October 2017, which coincided with the protests around the so-called “judiciary reform”.[10] This study showed that while 35% of the respondents declared support for the PiS changes of the functioning of key democratic institutions, half of those polled are opposed to them, including 32% ” strongly opposed”[11]. However, this declared opposition of a substantive part of the society is not translated into their support for the opposition parties. Indeed a vast majority of respondents in the same survey declare distrust of all political parties. Such generalized distrust of politics and political parties has been a feature of Polish political life, resulting in a consistently low electoral turnout. Another study conducted in the aftermath of the judiciary protests demonstrated how well the government propaganda can explore this generalized aversion to politics and political parties to demobilize the opponents of populists policies by branding opposition parties as demoralized, corrupt, and greedy for power; thus effectively undermining the opposition’s narrative that the PiS government is a threat to democracy. [12]

Conclusions – countering the backlash against open society

Understanding the complexities of populism’s appeal is necessary in order to find effective ways to reverse the populist upsurge or to resist the destruction of institutions and societal norms when populists are in power. Framing populism in narrow socio-economic categories and depicting populist voters as “victims of globalization” naturally puts emphasis on fixing social policies towards greater social inclusion, which is desirable in itself but hardly effective as far as undercutting the support for right wing authoritarian populism goes. For one thing, it is difficult to outbid populists in their promises of unrestricted spending and other socially popular but irresponsible policies (such as lowering the retirement age in Poland).

As was asserted in this essay, populism is a backlash against progressive and liberal social values and needs to be confronted directly by mobilizing those groups and social actors who are directly or indirectly threatened by populist policies, such as women and minorities. The power of the so-called “black protest” against the government’s assault on women’s rights is one good example of such social mobilization. Secondly, civil society groups and non-populist politicians need to reclaim social media and learn to challenge populism in the area of social communication. Thirdly, and most importantly, street protests, marches, and petitions will not by themselves defeat entrentched populists. Their defeat can only come through the ballot box. This means that countering any anti-populist backlash against an open society can only be effective if different groups and civil society organizations, as well as individuals, overcome their aversion to politics and translate their energy into effective political action.

The author of this article, Dr Jacek Kucharczyk, is President of the Institute of Public Affairs, one of Poland’s leading think-tanks.


The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, Jacek Kucharczyk.


[1] Norris, Pippa, “It’s not just Trump. Authoritarian populism is rising across the West. Here’s why”, The Washington Post (11 March 2016):

[2] For a more detailed analysis of the Polish case, including the socio-economic factor, see J. Kucharczyk et al. “When fear wins: causes and consequences of Poland’s populist turn” [in:] Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself. Mapping and responding to the rising culture and politics of fear in the European Union, DEMOS 2017, pp. 305-362

[3] Inglehart, Roland, Norris, Pippa, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash”, Faculty Research Working Paper Series, August 2016,

[4] See: Druciarek, Małgorzata, „Social conservatism and the cultural backlash in Poland“ in

Kucharczyk, et al., “When fear wins”, op. cit., pp. 338-335.

[5] The tweet was later replaced by a more neutral one, the original can still be found here at

[6] For a more detailed analysis of the impact of the refugee crisis and the relations between the PiS government and the EU, see “New Pact for Europe – National Report – Poland” at

[7] Zack Beauchamp, “White riot. How racism and immigration gave us Trump, Brexit, and a whole new kind of politics”, 20 January 2017, on 26 June 2017).

[8] See J. Fomina, J. Kucharczyk “Populism and Protest in Poland” [in:] Journal of Democracy, October 2016, Volume 27, Number 4, p. 58-68

[9] Maciej Gdula, Dobra zmiana w Miastku,

[10] For my account of the protests see:


[12] Roguska, B. “Krajobraz po wetach”, CBOS, komunikat z badań, 12/2017,